浪花直播

Image: 'The Allegory of Good and Bad Government' is a series of three fresco panels painted by the Italian artist Ambrogio Lorenzetti between 1338 and 1339 located in Palazzo Pubblico, Siena, Italy. These depictions are some of the earliest examples of civic rather than religious imagery in public spaces. This image depicts the 'Allegory of Bad Government.'

BY VLADIMIR GELMAN

This article first appeared in the online journal and has been lightly edited here for style.

Practically all analysts and observers of Russia today, regardless of their political leanings, tend to agree about the country鈥檚 poor quality of governance. According to the World Bank, the basic facets of good governance are respect for the rule of law, control over corruption, and effective state authorities operating with high-quality regulatory oversight. In the modern world, a high prevalence of all these factors is inherent in states with higher levels of socioeconomic development. In this regard, Russia systematically underperforms, with a quality of governance comparable to that of underdeveloped states in Africa and Latin America. In short, Russia鈥檚 quality of governance is far poorer than what would be expected from an urbanized, educated, and technologically advanced country. My new book, Bad Governance: Politics in Modern Russia, recently published by the European University Press in St. Petersburg, considers the reasons behind this state of affairs and the mechanisms that maintain it.

鈥淏ad governance鈥� has become a widespread term with multiple translations across cultures; in Russia, it is called 鈥�nedostoynoye pravleniye.鈥� But when it comes to understanding governance in Russia, the term may be a little misleading. Russia鈥檚 problems with poor-quality governance are more than a few 鈥渄esign flaws鈥� in the country鈥檚 mechanisms of public administration; this mechanism actually operates on fundamentally different grounds than those of the normative idea of 鈥済ood governance,鈥� the principles of which are implied to be trustworthy, reliable, impartial, uncorrupt and competent government institutions. This is because the dominant economic and political order of modern Russia is based on rent-seeking and corruption, which depend on poor-quality state regulation and routine violations of the rule of law. This order is buttressed at all levels of the regime鈥檚 鈥減ower vertical,鈥� which ensures that the 鈥渞ules of the game鈥� are implemented in such a way as to facilitate the ruling elites鈥� continued hold over the country. In lay terms, the shared goal of these elite groups is nothing less than the wholesale plundering of the country鈥檚 resources for as long as possible and on the largest scale possible鈥攐f course, without incurring any repercussions. The reality of life in modern Russia is saturated with examples of this approach to state governance: a vivid depiction can be seen in Andrey Zvyagintsev鈥檚 2014 film Leviathan.

How did this form of 鈥渂ad governance鈥� appear and take root in modern Russia? The two most widespread explanations are, in my opinion, both incorrect. The first blames Vladimir Putin and his entourage, who govern the country for their personal enrichment and by doing so jeopardize the national interest. While it is hard to disagree with much of this account, it is also a superficial and entirely 鈥渢op-down鈥� explanation. It is important to take into account that in the early 2000s, the Russian authorities did take a number of steps aimed at improving the quality of state governance (some of these were successful, but many of them failed). Furthermore, from Kazakhstan to Ukraine, many post-Soviet states are cursed with poor quality of governance not too different from, and in some cases much worse than, Russia鈥檚.

The second explanation holds that Russia鈥檚 quality of governance has always been poor, from the Soviet period all the way back to the times of Ivan the Terrible. This weighty 鈥渓egacy of the past鈥� is supposedly so deeply ingrained in Russia that it simply cannot be overcome. However, such a deterministic view as this cannot account for the variation in quality of governance across different regions of Russia, in certain political contexts, and in individual state institutions. This gives rise to some important questions: What role do these aforementioned 鈥渟uccess stories鈥� play? Can they change the overall dismal picture of governance in Russia? And why do some of these silver linings result in long-term changes for the country overall while others do not?

I maintain that, contrary to the opinion of many experts, 鈥渂ad governance鈥� is the global norm and 鈥済ood governance鈥� is by far the exception. Many rulers, past and present, have tried to conduct themselves as the leaders of our country do but are often hampered by restrictions on their power, which force them to care about their states鈥� quality of governance. Foreign policy plays an important role here: poorly run countries suffered defeats in wars, and their rulers risked losing power at the hands of the conquerors. The domestic political sphere is another limitation: corrupt and ineffective rulers can and have been overthrown by disgruntled elites in palace coups or by furious masses on the streets. There are also specific institutions that complicate any attempt to pursue poor governance: the judiciary, independent media, free elections, and autonomous civil servants, to name but a few. However, if and when these obstacles and restrictions slacken, then rulers are able to enrich and empower themselves with relative impunity. They can consolidate their position and ratchet up the rent-seeking without losing too much sleep over the long-term consequences for their country鈥檚 development.

While monarchs in ages past dreamed about handing a successful and prosperous kingdom to their anointed heirs, the leaders of post-Soviet states (with a few exceptions) can expect nothing of the sort. Their political vision and long-term plans end at the horizon of their rule. In Mancur Olson鈥檚 terminology, such rulers tend to behave as 鈥渘omadic鈥� and not as 鈥渟ettled鈥� brigands; for them, the most rational strategy of governance is to assume control over a country, formalize their informal power, and then sequester their wealth overseas. This strategy, argue Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alistair Smith in their Dictator鈥檚 Handbook, is very successful in securing authoritarian leaders鈥� hold on power, even if it comes at the cost of their own country鈥檚 decline.

In the case of Russia, the realities of domestic and foreign policy turned out to be very weak obstacles to 鈥渂ad governance.鈥� Furthermore, the painful and confusing experience of the transformations of the 1990s has in many senses legitimized the political status quo. Although the political elites did consider other approaches to managing the country, some of them and some segments of the population regarded these alternatives as risky and undesirable. Unsurprisingly, the political and economic order maintained by the authorities has benefited the elites immensely. For example, key companies have become the fiefdoms of important players in the informal ruling coalition, who redirect taxpayers鈥� money in their favor. In illustrating this trend, my book focuses on the example of Russian Railways under the management of Vladimir Yakunin鈥攁n example that is by no means exceptional.

However, Russia still has not collapsed. Russian leaders, realizing the risks that their own 鈥渂ad governance鈥� poses, are attempting to incorporate a kind of damage control into government mechanisms.  Admittedly, this extreme inefficiency sometimes covers up the basic fact of large-scale embezzlement of capital from the state. But increasingly, a number of important decisions in strategically important sectors of the state apparatus have been entrusted to qualified specialists, technocrats who are brought in to forestall catastrophic failures. The Central Bank of Russia, for example, is now fighting inflation with some success, while the Ministry of Finance will not permit a budget deficit and until recently conducted a successful taxation policy. These technocrats鈥� occasional achievements are a cause for some pride on the part of the leadership. This is how 鈥減ockets of efficiency鈥� arise: individual spheres of governance, projects, and institutions aim at achieving 鈥渟uccess stories.鈥� But the picture is not so rosy: as a rule, behind these achievements stand political patrons from the country鈥檚 top leadership and individual managers who act as 鈥減olicy entrepreneurs.鈥�

If and when these entrepreneurs 鈥渟ell鈥� their ideas to the state鈥檚 upper management, they will get carte blanche from the latter for special access to resources and special regulatory conditions in order to quickly achieve their promised 鈥渟uccess story.鈥� My book demonstrates that this approach can be found in many projects, from the Soviet space program to Moscow鈥檚 Higher School of Economics today. However, 鈥渟uccess stories鈥� in the context of 鈥渂ad governance鈥� face other constraints. First, rulers cannot have a large number of priority projects, as the success of some forecloses the possibility of implementing others. Furthermore, management鈥檚 priorities can change over time, as other projects and initiatives attract interest. Finally, political patronage is never eternal: a new ruler can threaten to put a stop to the innovations so cherished by the previous leadership. As I note in the book, the fate of Dmitry Medvedev鈥檚 planned Skolkovo Innovation Center is a good example.

In my opinion, the key reasons for 鈥渂ad governance鈥� in Russia lie in the nature of the country鈥檚 regime, which is often referred to as an electoral autocracy. Throughout the 1990s and particularly in the 2000s, the Russian political elite were convinced that an authoritarian regime could create the conditions for accelerated growth and development, following the example of some 鈥渄evelopmental dictatorships鈥� in East Asia. This idea generated enthusiasm among technocrats who feared that democracy would bring instability. But, as Dani Rodrik has rightly pointed out, 鈥渢here are many Mobutus for every Lee Kuan Yew,鈥� and the Russian experience may not prove an exception to the rule. Over time, the Russian leadership鈥檚 desire for authoritarian modernization decreased, as the institutions of electoral autocracy did not contribute to governing the country effectively.

Instead, the authorities sought to minimize the political risks posed by undesirable election results or mass protests while sacrificing any prospects of growth or development. Their planning horizon is therefore near term in nature; any blueprints for transformation are drawn up and implemented under pressure from rent-seeking elites. A telling example of their success is the fact that one such government program, Strategy 2010, was only 30 percent implemented, while its successor, Strategy 2020, was less than 30 percent implemented. Tensions and conflicts with the outside world, alongside the desire to protect the country from the West by any means, only accelerate these trends, as does Russian leaders鈥� baseless conviction that the last decades of the Soviet Union constituted a 鈥済olden age.鈥� This diagnosis leads to one conclusion: as long as Putin continues to lead the Russian state, in whatever post, there can be no talk of improving the quality of our country鈥檚 governance.

The more distant future presents another problem. Although the democratization of Russian politics and society is a necessary condition for any cardinal changes to 鈥渂ad governance,鈥� it is not sufficient alone. Ukraine鈥檚 experience after the Revolution of Dignity in 2014 indicates that, despite the existence of free and competitive elections, an independent press, and an active civil society, progress in reforming the state administration still remains very modest. In fact, experts doubt that such progress will be seen in the short term. Reversing 鈥渂ad governance鈥� will require the political will of the country鈥檚 leaders and society at large. It will require a large-scale, long-term effort, which will also exact costs from the country and its citizens. The success of these reforms will by no means be guaranteed. However, the only alternative is to maintain Russia鈥檚 political and economic status quo. In that scenario, the long-term cost to Russia could be even worse: the country鈥檚 decline could simply become irreversible.