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On November 21, Ambassador Alice Wells, the principal deputy assistant secretary of state for South and Central Asia, delivered an on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)鈥攖he most expensive and operationalized component of China鈥檚 Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)鈥攁t the 浪花直播 Center.

Wells, the top South Asia official at the State Department, did not mince words. She offered a comprehensive critique of CPEC that faulted the infrastructure super project for its high costs and lack of transparency, for burdening Pakistan with high debt, and for not bringing the types of economic benefits to Pakistan鈥攕uch as jobs鈥攖hat one might expect from such a major investment.

More broadly, Wells drew a sharp contrast between the Chinese sustainable growth model embodied by CPEC and the broader BRI鈥攚hich she suggested was highly unsustainable鈥攁nd that offered by the United States.

In this regard, the speech should be seen as a policy address on the 鈥攖he new Trump administration Asia policy that aims to articulate an American vision for growth and prosperity, one reflecting a 鈥渇ree and open鈥� and 鈥渞ules-based鈥� order that, in Washington鈥檚 view, is wholly lacking in China鈥檚 sustainable growth paradigm for Asia. While this contrast with Beijing is not articulated specifically in any of the administration鈥檚 speeches or documents on the Indo-Pacific strategy, it is very clearly implied.

Additionally, the harsh criticism of Beijing鈥擶ells was very explicit that she was targeting Chinese officialdom, referring repeatedly to the 鈥淐hinese Communist Party鈥� while expressing America鈥檚 support for the Chinese people鈥攔eflects the Trump administration鈥檚 unflinchingly hard line on the Chinese government. Indeed, while the administration has made conciliatory noises about some its most bitter rivals (think North Korea and even Iran), its position on China has been consistently hawkish.

To be sure, the type of criticism that Wells heaped on CPEC is not new

To be sure, the type of criticism that Wells heaped on CPEC is not new; for several years, observers鈥攊ncluding some CPEC boosters in Pakistan鈥攈ave of the risks of a project that could bring debt misery to a country already struggling with a serious balance of payments crisis, and that is so troublingly difficult to monitor because it is cloaked in so many layers of opacity.

However, no U.S. official had ever offered public comments on CPEC as direct and detailed as those of Wells. Both the Trump and Obama administrations had been strikingly quiet about the project, even as there was little reason for either to support a major initiative that involved America鈥檚 top strategic rival expanding its investments and influence in a country that figures prominently in U.S. strategic considerations, but where Washington is notably less present and popular than China.

This helps explain why Wells鈥� speech generated banner headlines for days in , , and also . The latter has regularly registered its opposition to a project spearheaded by its biggest strategic rival on the soil of its most bitter enemy, and it was likely quietly pleased with the speech鈥攅ven though it did not offer any public reaction.

China鈥檚 ambassador to Pakistan the speech, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman.

The speech didn鈥檛 only produce dozens of media reports鈥攊t also garnered attention on high levels in both Beijing and Islamabad. China鈥檚 ambassador to Pakistan the speech, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman. They made no effort to couch their criticism in the niceties of diplomatic speak; rather, they lambasted Wells鈥� speech as a smear and slander.

Meanwhile, in Islamabad, senior officials, , excoriated the speech, and the Pakistani Senate condemning it. That said, the reaction in Islamabad was notably more subdued than Beijing鈥檚 furious fusillade, perhaps reflecting Islamabad鈥檚 realization that the speech was critical of China, not Pakistan (indeed, toward the end of her remarks, Wells made a pitch for more American investment in Pakistan).

Predictably, the speech was a bonanza for the Asia Program鈥檚 impact metrics. Based on a variety of measures鈥攖he number of viewers of the live stream, the number and frequency of about the event, the of the speech on the 浪花直播 Center鈥檚 YouTube channel (several thousand a few days after the speech and more than 20,000 less than two weeks after it)鈥攖he attention directed to the event was greater than just about any other Asia Program product in recent memory.

The point here is not to brag about the Asia Program鈥檚 reach; rather, it is to highlight just how high-stakes and sensitive the CPEC project is for Beijing and Islamabad, and how seriously each capital takes the criticism of a senior U.S. official鈥攁nd especially when that criticism is so pointed and direct.

And above all else, this story showcases the extent and intensity of the strategic rivalry between the world鈥檚 two most powerful nations鈥攐ne that isn鈥檛 about to ease anytime soon.

Follow Michael Kugelman, deputy director of the Asia Program and senior associate for South Asia, on Twitter

The views expressed are the author's alone, and do not represent the views of the U.S. Government or the 浪花直播 Center. Copyright 2019, Asia Program. All rights reserved.