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A consensus is emerging in the Russian opposition that the recent elections in Russia and Vladimir Putin, who predictably was voted in as Russia鈥檚 president for another term, are not legitimate. They lack the real support of citizens such as might be expressed through ballots with real alternatives and in a less speech-repressing situation.

It is important that the subject of the Kremlin leader鈥檚 legitimacy has finally become mainstream within the opposition circles. But this consensus has arrived at a moment when political forces alternative to Putin鈥檚 political machine have either been silenced, jailed, or driven abroad.

During and after the previous presidential election, in 2018, most members of the Russian opposition had few illusions about the procedure鈥檚 fairness. Yet they thought that independent politicians had a duty to take part in the race to enhance their political credentials in a contest with a genuinely popular leader, Putin. 

鈥淧utin is the most popular politician,鈥� the opposition politician Dmitry Gudkov  at the time. 鈥淲e need to recognize that and think about what to do about it. We should not say that he is worthless and that we will go to the polls and win.鈥� 

鈥淚n 2024, Russia will not have a presidential election, but a ritual to reappoint Putin for the next 12 years,鈥� the same Gudkov said recently, echoing many of his colleagues, who had stopped seeing elections as a reflection of at least some real sentiment in Russian society. Six years ago, only Alexei Navalny  the word elections in quotation marks. Today it is a common practice among critically minded Russians.

Crying Foul: Too Late 

For the first time in its practice, the Russian election monitoring organization Golos did not just  some voting irregularities or falsifications but claimed that the entire 2024 election did not fulfill its basic purpose, 鈥渢o give an idea of citizens鈥� attitudes,鈥� and did not allow citizens to 鈥渋ndependently, freely make decisions about the future of their country.鈥� 

The illegitimacy of the state and its leader has become the central theme in the speeches of Yulia Navalnaya, who claims to be the main unifying figure of the Russian opposition after her husband鈥檚 death. She spoke about it in her speech before the EU Council on Foreign Affairs in Brussels on February 19, 2024, just three days after his murder, and in her March 13  in the Washington Post. 

A day earlier, the paper had published a  by the opposition politician and activist Vladimir Kara-Murza titled 鈥淰ladimir Putin鈥檚 Next Term Is Illegal.鈥� Both the language and the thought behind it are rapidly gaining currency.

But let us not forget that for more than two decades now, no real opposition figure has been able to challenge Putin鈥檚 standing because this standing was not achieved by fair electoral victories in the first place. 

This is why, at this stage, the opposition鈥檚 questioning of the Russian strongman鈥檚 electoral legitimacy does not come across as novel or surprising. It is, rather, stating the obvious. Exile politics, given its nature, almost inevitably is based on recognizing the ruling elites as illegitimate. 

Recognizing a leader鈥檚 illegitimacy might carry a lot more weight if it originates with a broad popular movement. The peaceful Belarusian protests following the heavily rigged 2020 presidential election is a case in point. Alexander Lukashenko鈥檚 80 percent 鈥渓andslide鈥� in that election was less impressive than Putin鈥檚 recent . Yet hundreds of thousands of Belarusians took to the streets in protest. According to the opposition, in the immediate aftermath of the voting more than half a million  in the cities of Belarus, a country with the population of 9.5 million people. 

The Belarusian public鈥檚 reaction was so unequivocal that it was not much of a stretch for many Western nations to recognize Lukashenko as illegitimate. In late September 2020 the EU  the legitimacy of the election, putting the word 鈥渋nauguration鈥� in quotation marks. The EU also condemned the repression and violence against the protesters. A Donald Trump鈥搇ed United States imposed sanctions on a few dozen Belarusian officials. Later, President Biden鈥檚 secretary of state, Antony Blinken, in a  called the 2020 elections 鈥渇raudulent.鈥� 

Recognition of Illegitimacy Must Come from Within

No Western nation would recognize the 2024 Putin election as free and fair, but the elephant in the room is Russian society鈥檚 conspicuous absence from the streets. Everybody understands the repressive nature of the Moscow regime. The cost of protest is prohibitively high. Yet by 2020, Lukashenko鈥檚 regime was arguably as repressive as its Russian backer鈥檚. 

There is no point in further debating the worth of public opinion polls in autocracies. We have every reason to , but we do not know the exact level of support for Putin. 

State legitimacy as demonstrated in real support of the state by citizens is not a legal phenomenon but a sociopsychological one. As such, a regime鈥檚 legitimacy or illegitimacy does not lead to larger international political decisions with clear and understandable consequences, such as the inclusion or exclusion of a country from certain international forums. Recognition of the Belarusian strongman Lukashenko鈥檚 regime and Venezuela鈥檚 Nicol谩s Maduro鈥檚 regime as illegitimate by several countries, to take a couple of examples, has not led to tangible changes in their international status. 

It remains to be seen what the statements from the United States and the EU after Putin鈥檚 early May official inauguration in the Kremlin might be, but Russia is too large and significant to warrant a complete ban on contacts with the regime. 

After all, not a single Soviet leader was elected. The Soviet regime, to which today鈥檚 Russia is a self-proclaimed , started out as illegitimate. Domestically, communist leaders established their legitimacy through the violence of the 1918鈥�1922 Civil War, while internationally they achieved it through skillful foreign relations policies. Other countries鈥� politicians, including those of the West, ended up talking to Soviet Russia鈥檚 de facto rulers. 

U.S. politicians talked to the Soviet leadership during times of crises. During the late Soviet era those  became regular and were a highlight of international politics of the time. 

It does make sense for world leaders to continue talking to the Moscow authorities on issues of security or other vital issues. It is up to Russian society to express its understanding of whether the current rulers legitimately hold their positions at the heart of the Russian state. 

The opinions expressed in this article are those solely of the author and do not reflect the views of the Kennan Institute.