浪花直播

As the geopolitical competition between China and the United States heats up, most analyses have focused on , China鈥檚 to build infrastructure across the region and place itself at the center of the region鈥檚 geopolitical destiny, the administration鈥檚 still-gestating , and Washington鈥檚 trade strategy following its withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Yet there is another aspect of the broader geopolitical political competition between China and the United States that has received less attention 鈥� ideology. Though long dormant in bilateral relations between the two sides, Beijing鈥檚 growing geopolitical ambitions 鈥� combined with a more competitive approach from Washington 鈥� is pushing ideology to the fore of geopolitical competition that has been unseen since the end of the Cold War.

China鈥檚 recent 19^th Party Congress, and the National People鈥檚 Congress that followed, caught a great deal of international attention because of the and the of a new cadre of leaders for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Yet each event also included significant ideological elements that are also significant geopolitically. In his speech to the assembled Party elite, Xi described his vision for the future of Chinese society under the aegis of 鈥�,鈥� which state media later described as 鈥渢he latest achievement in adapting Marxism to the Chinese context.鈥� In his remarks, to 鈥渟nap back into line鈥� and focus on governance, politics and ideology. He said 鈥淚deology determines the direction a culture should take and the path it should follow as it develops,鈥� and called on China鈥檚 writers and artists to produce work that is thought-provoking but also extols 鈥渙ur party, our country, our people and our heroes.鈥�

At home, Xi鈥檚 ideological push has meant a re-emphasis on Marxism-Leninism (usually emphasizing the latter) and a reassertion of the Chinese Communist Party into daily life, with an especially heavy dose of nationalism and exhortations of Xi鈥檚 greatness added for good measure. Indeed, China鈥檚 state media recently produced a documentary 鈥�  鈥� about the greatness of Xi Jinping.

Yet Xi鈥檚 ideological push has also taken a place within China鈥檚 more ambitious and assertive approach to foreign affairs and has significant geopolitical implications on its own. While the forms of this narrative vary, the broad ideological message from China (, for example) is that the world is increasingly chaotic and in need of new ideas and new leadership. Chinese state media to Western liberal democracy as beset by 鈥渃rises and chaos,鈥� and that 鈥渁fter several hundred years, the Western model is showing its age. It is high time for profound reflection on the ills of a doddering democracy which has precipitated so many of the world's ills and solved so few. If Western democracy is not to collapse completely it must be revitalized, reappraised and rebooted.鈥�

Unlike past rhetoric from Beijing, which denied its system as a model for the world because of China鈥檚 unique history and status, Chinese official media today openly uphold China鈥檚 system as a better model for the world to study and follow. compared the political systems of the West and China, stating that 鈥淯nlike competitive, confrontational Western politics, the CPC and non-Communist parties cooperate with each other, working together for the advancement of socialism and striving to improve the people's standard of living.鈥� Beijing points to the remarkable economic growth and political stability that China has enjoyed under the CCP鈥檚 leadership, and offers itself to the world as a model and guide for the world.

Most ominously, Chinese state media at the close of the 19^th Party Congress China鈥檚 assent to be an ideological model for the world and a clear competitor with Western liberal democracy:

By the end of 2016, there were 13 countries whose populations exceeded 100 million. Ten of them are developing countries. China's success proves that socialism can prevail and be a path for other developing countries to emulate and achieve modernization. China is now strong enough, willing, and able to contribute more for mankind. The new world order cannot be just dominated by capitalism and the West, and the time will come for a change.

Interestingly, and less commented-upon, has been increasingly ideological statements coming from the administration within the context of geopolitical competition with China. For example, the describes China (and Russia) as 鈥渄etermined to make economies less free and less fair鈥� and to 鈥渞epress their societies.鈥� It goes on: 鈥淩ival actors use propaganda and other means to try to discredit democracy. They advance anti-Western views and spread false information to create divisions among ourselves, our allies, and our partners.鈥�

The injection of ideological competition into the broader geopolitical competition between Washington and Beijing suggests that the bilateral relationship is growing increasingly adversarial. No longer seen as a struggle between two major powers with conflicting interests and different political systems, ideological competition suggests that something greater may be at stake. This is a dynamic we have not seen since the end of the Cold War, when the United States and the Soviet Union viewed one another as locked in an ideological competition for the future of the world.

While ideological competition between Washington and Beijing is unlikely to reach such apocalyptic heights, it will play an increasingly significant feature in their respective efforts to build support across the Indo-Pacific. Beijing will use its burgeoning ideological proselytizing as a tool to reach out to illiberal U.S. allies and partners and attempt to peel them away from Washington鈥檚 sway. While the success of these efforts will likely lie more in how Beijing manages traditional concerns of wealth and power, an ideological component to their outreach could make their pitch that much more attractive.

The implications of this competition are significant and should be integrated into U.S. foreign policy making and rhetoric. Upholding the benefits of political and economic liberalism, and identifying the many challenges caused by illiberal systems, has long been a critical facet of American foreign policy (even though we have failed to live up to those ideals ourselves). But past victories over undemocratic forces should not breed complacency 鈥� this should be a wakeup call for the United States to reach out to like-minded allies and partners and openly and proudly espouse the benefits of political and economic liberalism. It may be more chaotic than its illiberal alternatives, but the benefits it provides to its people and societies cannot be ignored. This is a powerful tool of international statecraft, and Washington needs to be more proactive in its use.

The views expressed are the author's alone, and do not represent the views of the U.S. Government or the 浪花直播 Center.  Copyright 2018, Asia Program.  All rights reserved.