浪花直播鈥檚 China Environment Forum is proud to announce that we are launching our first interactive infographic: a map of . The map underscores China鈥檚 energy and water imbalances and the looming choke point China faces in terms of water, food, and energy security. The map also illustrates how consumer goods made in China鈥檚 factories along its eastern coast are powered by coal and hydropower in the country鈥檚 western provinces.
Feeding the Beasts
Mammoth infrastructure development is keeping China鈥檚 economic engine running at a fast clip. But China鈥檚 urban and industrial centers on the east coast still face energy shortages, in large part because most wind, coal, and hydro power plants are concentrated in the country鈥檚 inland provinces. China鈥檚 northern grain belt also faces water shortages as increasing coal production uses more and more water.
Instead of addressing the sources of these water and energy imbalances through conservation and other demand management techniques, China鈥檚 policymakers are 鈥渇eeding the beasts鈥 by undertaking two huge infrastructure projects.
The first is the , the largest infrastructure project in the world, which will eventually transfer 35 billion cubic meters of water every year from China鈥檚 wet south to its dry north.
The second is the West-East Electricity Transfer Project. Initiated during the 10th five-year plan (2000 to 2005), the project is designed to bring investment and development to China鈥檚 lagging west while satisfying the growing electricity needs of the country鈥檚 eastern provinces.
The project鈥檚 first phase has been and is continuing to expand the western provinces鈥 electricity-generating capacity, primarily through the construction of new coal bases and hydroelectric dams. The second ongoing component is the construction of three electricity-transmission corridors that connect newly built generation capacity in the north, central, and south to the coast (see arrows on map).
Each of the corridors is expected to 鈥 a combined capacity equivalent to . The seven recipient provinces 鈥 Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shanghai, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, and Guangdong 鈥 together consume nearly .
Yunnan鈥檚 Nuozhadu Dam on the Mekong River was constructed as a part of this project, and has been touted as part of the backbone of the southern corridor, sending two-thirds of its output to Guangdong 鈥 the leading province in export manufacturing.
The controversial Three Gorges Dam is an integral component in the central corridor, 鈥 China鈥檚 second largest manufacturing region, behind Guangdong. The southern corridor also receives energy from the Three Gorges Dam, albeit only about 16 percent of the dam鈥檚 output.
Also along the central corridor, connects the Xiangjiaba dam on the Yangtze River (between Yunnan and Sichuan provinces) to Shanghai. It is 1,287 miles long and has a capacity of 6.4 gigawatts.
鈥淢ade Possible by Coal and Water鈥
Though the West-East Project brings energy security to the east coast, it exacerbates water and food insecurity in the fragile ecosystems of the west. Because China鈥檚 eastern economic powerhouse provinces rely on western-made electricity, the energy sectors in the west take priority over local residential and agricultural water users.
These conflicting demands are creating vulnerabilities 鈥 or choke points 鈥 that China must address to sustain its current growth.
For example, while Yunnan鈥檚 rivers are only a modest part of the South-North Water Transfer Project, there are worries about the region鈥檚 ongoing three year drought. This creates tension between local agricultural needs and those of Yunnan鈥檚 dependents, and if the south and the north experience drought at the same time and Guangdong province is still demanding power from Yunnan, the situation could potentially be much worse.
In fact, Yunnan鈥檚 drought has already had impacts in Guangdong. In the summer of 2011, factories in Guangdong province were asked to cut power at different hours of the day for varying lengths of time because dams in Guizhou, Guangxi, and Yunnan were producing electricity far below capacity 鈥 some as . In total, during early 2012, reserve hydropower capacity in the three provinces of the southern corridor was down , thanks to the ongoing drought.
But perhaps even more troubling, the West-East Electricity Transfer Project illustrates how the Western world is driving the increasing use of coal and hydropower in China. Indeed, much of the electricity produced from coal and hydropower in western China is transmitted across the country to factories making cheap goods for Western customers. It seems that in addition to 鈥渕ade in China,鈥 most of our consumer goods should perhaps say, 鈥渕ade possible by coal and water.鈥
David Tyler Gibson is a research assistant for the 浪花直播 Center鈥檚 China Environment Forum.
Update: A previous version of this article stated that Yunnan鈥檚 rivers were 鈥渂eing diverted north as part of the South-North Water Transfer Project,鈥 but the only section that is upstream of Yunnan (the Western Line) has yet to come online. Furthermore, this would only be one river 鈥 the Jinsha (aka the Upper Yangtze). The Mekong and the Salween Rivers in Yunnan are not being diverted as a part of the South-North Water Transfer Project, though they are being heavily dammed.
Map Credit: James Conkling, fellow at Amnesty International, and David Tyler Gibson. Special thanks to Zifei Yang for her help in finding the data, and Jennifer Turner, Susan Shifflett, Aubrey Parker, and Katie Beck for their valuable input.
Sources: ABB, China Data Online, Circle of Blue, The Economic Observer, The Economist, State Grid Corporation of China, U.S. Department of the Interior Bureau of Reclamation.
This article was first posted on the on , the blog of the Environmental Change and Security Program.
